



# Monthly Comments – Emerging Markets

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MacroFinance Research – November 2020

## Key Messages

### **Country Focus – Indonesia: Out of economic tight spot in 2021H2, but structural problems to endure**

Indonesia witnessed technical recession in 2020 due to the unprecedented impact of Covid-19 that forced stringent lockdown measures, a relaxation of which eventually did spike the infections in October only. Indonesia also faced elevated ex-ante vulnerabilities (existing prior to Covid-19) with subpar momentum of domestic demand, uncompetitive currency and increasing short-term debt levels, along with a populist regime with poor control of corruption. While these structural conditions have eroded, the monetary support by the Central Bank, the adequate forex reserves, and expected favorable global oil prices in 2021, should lead to an asymmetric V shaped recovery in 2021H2. However, going forward, despite the economic turnaround, the vulnerabilities that existed before Covid-19 will endure and could also be exacerbated, unless the government improves business and investment climate, addresses the twin (fiscal and current account) deficits and improves labor market flexibility.

*Read more on page 2...*

### **RiskWatch – Update of Debt Balance: low risk continues despite marginal deterioration**

Our annual update of the Debt Balance reveals a slight deterioration in 2019 due to increase in external borrowings across most countries while inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI) receded. **China**, to a large extent, as well as most of the smaller countries (**Sub-Saharan Africa**) and commodity depended countries (**MENA**) have witnessed an increase in their external debt, while FDI have reduced. The **10 Key EM** have continued to attract a sizable portion of more stable FDI while their relative external borrowings remain manageable (barring **Turkey**). This unfavorable move on the Debt Balance shall significantly worsen in 2020 due to the unprecedented Covid-19 crisis that will heighten the external borrowings of most countries, while FDI inflows should substantially decrease, especially for medium and small economies.

*View more on page 4...*

### **Dashboard & Heatmap – Global Credit Risk, Covid-19 & Country Risk Premium Heatmap**

Our updated Heatmap looks at performances and risks through each country's financial risks, growth sensitivity to the pandemic / health situation, and their ex ante vulnerabilities.

*View more on page 7...*

As always, readers are most welcome to come back to us for further details or clarifications.

Completed on November 17, 2020.

## Country Focus – Indonesia: Out of economic tight spot in 2021H2, but structural problems to endure

Indonesia witnessed technical recession in 2020 due to the unprecedented impact of Covid-19 that forced stringent lockdown measures, a relaxation of which eventually did spike the infections in October only. Indonesia also faced elevated ex-ante vulnerabilities (existing prior to Covid-19) with subpar momentum of domestic demand, uncompetitive currency and increasing short-term debt levels, along with a populist regime with poor control of corruption. While these structural conditions have eroded, the monetary support by the Central Bank, the adequate forex reserves, and expected favorable global oil prices in 2021, should lead to an asymmetric V shaped recovery in 2021H2. However, going forward, despite the economic turnaround, the vulnerabilities that existed before Covid-19 will endure and could also be exacerbated, unless the government improves business and investment climate, addresses the twin (fiscal and current account) deficits and improves labor market flexibility.

### Worsening Economic and Financial Risk

Over the past two years, Indonesia’s Eco. & Fin. Risk ratings has steeply deteriorated (51-C in 2020Q3) because of the significant fall in our leading indicator for domestic demand, of an upward revision in external debt that has deteriorated the Debt and the Liquidity Balances, and of the persistent currency overvaluation. This deterioration in Eco. & Fin. Risk ratings, along with worsening Political Risk ratings (populist government of President J. Widodo’s undermining the independence of institutions) is reflected in the elevated index of ex-ante vulnerability.

#### Indonesia: Country-Risk Assessment under Covid

Ex-ante Vulnerability,  
Global Credit Risk and Growth Sensitivity to Covid  
from 0 (best) to 100 (worst)

	Indonesia
Eco. & Fin. Risk rating	51
Political Risk rating	51
<b>Ex-ante Vulnerability</b>	<b>67</b>
Liquidity Risk	61
Fx Debt Risk	29
Corporate Risk	52
Sovereign Risk	49
<b>Global Credit Risk</b>	<b>48</b>
Covid Health Situation	60
Health Vulnerability	100
Stringency of lockdowns	34
International Trade - Supply chains	30
International Trade -Demand-side	34
<b>Growth Sensitivity to Covid-19</b>	<b>42</b>


Source: TAC ECONOMICS

Since the pandemic, Indonesia has entered technical recession (first time since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998) even as the GDP contraction eased in 2020Q3 (-3.5% y/y after -5.3% in Q2) given a mechanic collapse in both demand and production directly related to stringent lockdown measures. In addition, our Global

Credit Risk metric has deteriorated with increase in amortization (from 21bn\$ to 74bn\$ in 2020) worsening the Liquidity Risk, and an increase in external borrowings has elevated Sovereign Risk. Moreover, the epidemic itself is yet to taper significantly (despite recent favorable inflection), hence maintaining the economic recovery trajectory still uncertain.

#### Indonesia: Risk-Scores on Fundamental Balances

from 0 (lowest risk) to 100 (highest risk)



Source: TAC ECONOMICS

### Challenges on the road to recovery

The peak of the stringent lockdown measures that crippled economic activity is unlikely to be repeated despite resurgence of new Covid-19 cases peaking in early October 2020. Yet, business conditions remain subpar (Manufacturing PMI at 47.8 in Oct. 2020), the household confidence level remains mediocre, and slow implementation of policy support (fiscal package equivalent to 4% of GDP) indicate that a faster recovery would not materialize before 2021. Moreover, the Indonesian Rupiah, which is already significantly overvalued (about 20% against its main competitors) is expected to further strengthen next year (USD/IDR 13,500-13,700 in 2020Q2) due to more favorable global prices (but it will erode further its export earnings).

**A recovery nonetheless**

Even with the ample challenges, Indonesia enjoys a few strong fundamentals, along with some propitious factors that would help in an economic rebound in 2021. The strong foreign reserves (USD 130bn in Oct. covering close to 8 months of imports), contained inflationary pressure (+1.4% y/y in Oct.), well capitalized banking sector (capital adequacy ratio above 20%), an expected increase in global oil prices (65\$/bl in 2021-end), faster than expected recovery of the Chinese economy, and Central Bank's liquidity injection (a cumulative 100bps cut in policy rate through the year, and bond purchases in the primary market) should facilitate an asymmetric V-shaped economic recovery. GDP contraction is expected reach only -2% y/y in 2020, a narrower contraction especially when compared to other G20 countries; it will be followed by +6% rebound in 2021.

However, this recovery does not obliterate the structural challenges that existed prior to Covid-19 crisis. The government needs to address its twin deficits, improve revenue generation, improve labor market flexibility and enhance its business climate to attract investment.

**Revision of external debt data:**

This month's RiskMonitor update incorporates new data on external debt for 2019 (cf. detailed analysis in the RiskWatch section, page 4), with significant upward revision on debt servicing for 2018-2025. Consequently, higher principal repayments lead entails mediocre degradation of Indonesia's trajectory on the Debt and Liquidity Balances, as well as upward move of the average Economic and Financial Risk ratings (to 50.8-C in 2020Q3 from 45.1-C in 2020Q2), pointing to some potential short-term financial vulnerability and tense external debt's sustainability.

## RiskWatch – Update of Debt Balance: *low risk* continues despite marginal deterioration

Our annual update of the Debt Balance reveals a slight deterioration in 2019 due to increase in external borrowings across most countries while inflows of foreign direct investments (FDI) receded. **China**, to a large extent, as well as most of the smaller countries (**Sub-Saharan Africa**) and commodity depended countries (**MENA**) have witnessed an increase in their external debt, while FDI have reduced. The **10 Key EM** have continued to attract a sizable portion of more stable FDI while their relative external borrowings remain manageable (barring **Turkey**). This unfavorable move on the Debt Balance shall significantly worsen in 2020 due to the unprecedented Covid-19 crisis that will heighten the external borrowings of most countries, while FDI inflows will substantially decrease, especially for medium and small economies.


RiskMonitor’s Debt Balance evaluates the medium-term foreign currency funding characteristics and performances. It is not designed to look at solvency issues for specific borrowers (for example, sovereign risk is examined in the Sovereign Balance) but observes whether a country can find a balanced way of funding its development with foreign currency resources. In particular, the structural quality of a country’s external financing is combined with the ability to balance external debt with more stable inflows of foreign direct investment. Annual data on external debt up to 2019 published by the World Bank are incorporated here.

### Revisions of past data:

Along with new data on external debt for 2019, World Bank’s International Debt Statistics database integrates some revisions for past data. Large downward change has been observed for Myanmar (total external debt down by -30% in 2013-2018 to USD 11bn in 2018), while UAE (+37%), Comoros (+34%), Guinea (+52%), Guinea-Bissau (+29%), Libya (+73%), Mozambique (+24%) have registered major upward revisions, with generally negative impact on their debt service indicator.

### Debt Balance in 2019: lingers in *low risk* area

In 2019, the average position for the 100 EMs remained in the *low risk* area despite the marginal increase in the *debt service*, while the *financial stability* roughly stabilized around the 2018 level. Nevertheless, the inching of the trajectory closer to the primary (horizontal) threshold indicates that any further increase in external debt (a very likely outcome of the Covid-19 crisis in 2020) will lead to an entry into the *intermediate risk* area of the Debt Balance. Meanwhile the 10 Key EMs fair better with improved *financial stability* (increased inflow of FDI) and with modest increase in *debt service*.




Source: TAC ECONOMICS

### Increasing external debt in EM

External debt for 100 EMs has modestly increased in 2019 (+6%) with an overall uptick in cross-border borrowings across all countries, especially small and/or commodities dependent economies (Africa and MENA). In parallel, Chinese external debt remains the largest among all the EMs (18% of the total stock in 2019).

### EM External Debt Stocks (USD bn)




Sources: World Bank, TAC ECONOMICS

Meanwhile, international trade conditions degraded in 2019 (-4% y/y for 100 EMs) because of the persistent trade tensions between US and China. However, going into 2020, most of the data and its analysis in 2019 would dwarf in comparison to the jolt to the international trading system and the likely skyrocketing of external debt by the EMs to combat the unprecedented impact of Covid-19. Corporates and sovereigns would be highly challenged and their debt sustainability will be tested, especially for the medium and small economies (**Chile, Colombia, Ukraine, Ivory Coast, Niger, Mali, Senegal**) that already have sizeable borrowings from multilateral institutions.

When looking at stock of external debt as a percentage of GDP, we observe:

- 1) There is a large divergence among EMs based on their size. The **50 Smallest** and the **30 Mid-Size** have significantly larger share of external debt to GDP than the **10 Key EM** and the **Next 10**. Smaller EMs will tend to have less developed domestic debt markets and higher share of funding from multilateral financial institutions.
- 2) External debt to GDP ratios have increased in LatAm, Africa and MENA regions, but have remained relatively stable in Europe and Asia, the latter being much less exposed to non-resident creditors.




Source: TAC ECONOMICS

### FDI inflows dwindled, mainly on China's account

The rebound in FDI witnessed in 2018 was reversed in 2019 predominantly due to the contraction in FDI flows to China (-33%) given the uncertainties surrounding the trade war with the US. While direct investments into the 9 Key EMs improved marginally (8%), FDI inflows in intermediate and smaller EMs, especially in Africa, contracted. This falling trend in global FDI to EMs will be

significantly exacerbated in 2020 due to the unprecedented economic impact of Covid-19 crisis.




Sources: World Bank, TAC ECONOMICS

### Wide dispersion among EMs and rocky path ahead

The following graphs present a snapshot of 100 EMs' latest position on the Debt Balance, and decennial trend for each group and region. Some noticeable observations that emerge are:


- 1) Five countries (**Angola, Argentina, Qatar, Tunisia, and UAE**) are located in the *high risk* quadrant in 2019, with only Tunisia entering the most unfavorable area due to degradation of *financing stability* to an insufficient level.
- 2) On the bottom-left *intermediate risk* quadrant, countries witnessing persistent (geo)political tensions (**Libya, Iran, Venezuela, Yemen**) exhibit low levels of external debt and also unsurprisingly fail to attract FDI inflows.
- 3) Most of the **10 Key EM** continue to be best placed in *low risk* quadrant (or closed to main risk threshold like **South Korea, Poland, and Turkey**) given the fact they attract considerable FDI inflows and retain manageable external debt levels.
- 4) Meanwhile among the EM groups; *debt service* in **MENA** countries (most of which are commodity dependent) has been on the raise over the years while *financing stability* remained subpar.
- 5) **Europe** remained in the *intermediate risk* area on average, due to combination of excessive external indebtedness and strong *financing stability*.
- 6) While **Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa** and **Latin America** are all placed in *low risk quadrant*, Asia has the most favorable move with improving *financing stability* and still comfortable level of *debt service*.

**Debt Balance by Country - 2019**




Source: TAC ECONOMICS

**Debt Balance by Group**



Source: TAC ECONOMICS


**Debt Balance by Region**



Source: TAC ECONOMICS

# Global Credit Risk, Covid-19 & Country Risk Premium Heatmap

List of 100 countries by ISO3 Code alphabetic order



## Appendices

### Appendix 1: List of 100 countries by ISO3 Code alphabetic order

ISO 3 Code	Country Name	ISO 3 Code	Country Name	ISO 3 Code	Country Name
AGO	Angola	GHA	Ghana	OMN	Oman
ALB	Albania	GIN	Guinea	PAK	Pakistan
ARG	Argentina	GNB	Guinea Bissau	PAN	Panama
ARM	Armenia	GTM	Guatemala	PER	Peru
AZE	Azerbaijan	HND	Honduras	PHL	Philippines
BEN	Benin	HRV	Croatia	POL	Poland
BFA	Burkina Faso	HUN	Hungary	PRY	Paraguay
BGD	Bangladesh	IDN	Indonesia	QAT	Qatar
BGR	Bulgaria	IND	India	ROU	Romania
BHR	Bahrein	IRN	Iran	RUS	Russia
BIH	Bosnia	ISR	Israel	RWA	Rwanda
BLR	Belarus	JOR	Jordan	SAU	Saudi Arabia
BOL	Bolivia	KAZ	Kazakhstan	SDN	Sudan
BRA	Brazil	KEN	Kenya	SEN	Senegal
BRN	Brunei	KHM	Cambodia	SLV	El Salvador
CHL	Chile	KOR	Korea	SRB	Serbia
CHN	China	KWT	Kuwait	SYC	Seychelles
CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	LAO	Laos	TGO	Togo
CMR	Cameroon	LBY	Libya	THA	Thailand
COD	DR Congo	LKA	Sri Lanka	TUN	Tunisia
COG	Rep. of Congo	MAR	Morocco	TUR	Turkey
COL	Colombia	MDG	Madagascar	TWN	Taiwan
COM	Comoros	MEX	Mexico	TZA	Tanzania
CPV	Cape Verde	MKD	N. Macedonia	UAE	UAE
CRI	Costa Rica	MLI	Mali	UGA	Uganda
CZE	Czech Rep.	MMR	Myanmar	UKR	Ukraine
DMA	Dominica	MNE	Montenegro	URY	Uruguay
DOM	Dominican Rep	MNG	Mongolia	VEN	Venezuela
DZA	Algeria	MOZ	Mozambique	VNM	Vietnam
ECU	Ecuador	MUS	Mauritius	YEM	Yemen
EGY	Egypt	MYS	Malaysia	ZAF	South Africa
ETH	Ethiopia	NER	Niger	ZMB	Zambia
GAB	Gabon	NGA	Nigeria		
GEO	Georgia	NPL	Nepal		



**Appendix 2: List of 100 countries monitored by region**

<b>Eastern &amp; Central Europe, CIS (19)</b>				<b>Middle East &amp; North Africa (15)</b>			
ALB	Albania	KAZ	Kazakhstan	DZA	Algeria	MAR	Morocco
ARM	Armenia	MNE	Montenegro	BHR	Bahrein	OMN	Oman
AZE	Azerbaijan	MKD	N. Macedonia	EGY	Egypt	QAT	Qatar
BLR	Belarus	POL	Poland	IRN	Iran	SAU	Saudi Arabia
BIH	Bosnia	ROU	Romania	ISR	Israel	TUN	Tunisia
BGR	Bulgaria	RUS	Russia	JOR	Jordan	UAE	UAE
HRV	Croatia	SRB	Serbia	KWT	Kuwait	YEM	Yemen
CZE	Czech Rep.	TUR	Turkey	LBY	Libya		
GEO	Georgia	UKR	Ukraine				
HUN	Hungary						
<b>Latin America (18)</b>				<b>Sub-Saharan Africa (30)</b>			
ARG	Argentina	SLV	El Salvador	AGO	Angola	MDG	Madagascar
BOL	Bolivia	GTM	Guatemala	BEN	Benin	MLI	Mali
BRA	Brazil	HND	Honduras	BFA	Burkina Faso	MUS	Mauritius
CHL	Chile	MEX	Mexico	CMR	Cameroon	MOZ	Mozambique
COL	Colombia	PAN	Panama	CPV	Cape Verde	NER	Niger
CRI	Costa Rica	PRY	Paraguay	COM	Comoros	NGA	Nigeria
DMA	Dominica	PER	Peru	COG	Rep. of Congo	RWA	Rwanda
DOM	Dominican Rep	URY	Uruguay	COD	DR Congo	SEN	Senegal
ECU	Ecuador	VEN	Venezuela	CIV	Cote d'Ivoire	SYC	Seychelles
				ETH	Ethiopia	ZAF	South Africa
<b>Asia (18)</b>				GAB	Gabon	SDN	Sudan
BGD	Bangladesh	MNG	Mongolia	GHA	Ghana	TZA	Tanzania
BRN	Brunei	MMR	Myanmar	GIN	Guinea	TGO	Togo
KHM	Cambodia	NPL	Nepal	GNB	Guinea Bissau	UGA	Uganda
CHN	China	PAK	Pakistan	KEN	Kenya	ZMB	Zambia
IND	India	PHL	Philippines				
IDN	Indonesia	LKA	Sri Lanka				
KOR	Korea	TWN	Taiwan				
LAO	Laos	THA	Thailand				
MYS	Malaysia	VNM	Vietnam				

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